In The Supreme Court of
On Friday, the 24th day of April 1964
Before
Their Lordships
Lionel Brett |
...... |
Justice, Supreme Court |
John Idowu Conrad Taylor |
...... |
Justice, Supreme Court |
Vahe Bairamian |
...... |
Justice, Supreme Court |
FSC.
46/1963
Between
James Oguntimeyin |
....... |
Appellant |
And
Kpekpe Gubere Namigin
Rhoraye (For themselves and on behalf of Oria Fmilly of Aladja) |
....... |
Respondent |
Judgement of the Court
Delivered by
Vahe Bairamian. J.S.C
I |
n this appeal the
defendant complains of the judgement given by Kester
J. in the Warri Suit No. W/87/1957 in favour of the Oria family. The Oria case was that they were the
owners of a large area known as Ekrorhior Quarter at Aladja;
that within it, in years gone by, the Orias had
granted two enclaves to ancestors of the defendant, but he was laying a claim
to more.
The Orias began their suit with a plan marked Exhibit B; (it is
plan No MWC/40/57); on it their land was shown verged blue, and the
enclaves verged pink. Learned counsel for the defendant tells us that the Claim
originally was for a declaration of title to the land edged pink, and an
injunction. In the Statement of Claim the Orias ask
for a declaration to the land verged in blue, and an order restraining the
defendant from entering beyond the areas verged in pink. That was clear enough:
it conceded to the defendant the two enclaves - one to the east and the other
to the west of the road shown on the plan, and the defendant was not to go
outside them. There was, however, a mistake, namely that, without wishing it,
the Orias were asking for a declaration which
included those enclaves.
Paragraph 6 of the
Defence states that ––
"The defendant is unable to understand plaintiffs' contention as
to the cause of action in the present suit and contends that on plaintiffs' own
showing in the statement of claim there ought to be judgement for the defendant
in respect of the area verged pink to which area the defendant asserts his
claim. In order to bring out this contention clearly defendant will at the
hearing produce in court a plan of the area to which he lays claim and in
respect of which he joins issue with the plaintiff. The defendant however joins
issue with plaintiff only in respect of the land claimed by him in accordance
with his own plan."
Adroit, but not quite
candid; for the defendant's plan which is Exhibit C (No G. A. 290A/57)
shows to the west of the road a much larger piece than the Orias
were conceding, and the Orias were to wait until the
hearing before they could see what it was. What was worse was this: shortly
before the case was to come on, the defendant applied for leave to delete the
word 'only' near the close of paragraph 6 of his Defence; but in the event that
was not allowed. The Court note of 25th May, 1960 states that ––
"There is a dispute as to the extent of the land in dispute. I
hereby grant leave for the Plaintiffs' plan to be withdrawn and for the land claimed
by the defendant to be shown in a different colour, on the plaintiffs' plan and
according to the scale to which the plaintiffs' plan is drawn."
On the 26th
May, counsel for the plaintiffs, realising that the area coloured pink on his
plan was not in dispute, asked for an adjournment for three months, and had
another plan made, namely the plan marked Exhibit A: it is plan No
MWC/40B/57. When the hearing began he called the plaintiffs' surveyor to put in
the new plan, and the surveyor in his evidence under cross-examination, said
that-
"The area now in dispute amounting (perhaps a mistake for 'according') to Exhibit A is the area verged
pink to the North West of the area edged green in Exhibit A.
The areas marked pink and green in Exhibit A are the areas represented
in this plan No GA/290A/57 produced
in Court”.
The note goes on to
state "Plan produced and tendered by the defendant marked Exhibit C."
For convenience, it would seem, the defendant's surveyor was called next as the
first witness for the defendant, and he confirmed what the plaintiffs' surveyor
had testified. Thus at the outset of the trial both sides knew what was in
controversy between them.
There was a formal
defect left by oversight: Plaintiffs' counsel did not ask for amendment of the
Writ of Summons and of the Statement of Claim to bring them into line with the
new plan, exhibit A, in the matter of colour. After the evidence was closed,
learned counsel for the defendant began his address by referring to the claim,
and drew attention to the writ of Summons and the description of the land over
which title was sought as being edged pink; whereupon counsel for the
plaintiffs asked leave to amend the writ to read in paragraph (a) 'blue'
instead; and the Judge adjourned for a week to let him bring a full application
for any amendment he wished to make. The application brought was to amend the
writ of summons so that the claim should be for a declaration to the land
verged in blue, and for an injunction in regard to the land verged pink: pink
was, on Exhibit A, the plaintiffs' new plan put in at the outset of the trial,
what the defendant claimed as his own over and above what the plaintiffs conceded
which was shown in green. In addition the application asked for amendment of
the Statement of Claim on similar lines.
At the hearing of the
application, counsel for the defendant argued that the amendment should not be
allowed on the ground that it was embarrassing to the defence, which was
conducted on the basis of the averment in the Defence; that the plaintiffs had
made a mistake in not amending their pleadings before the close of their case,
and it was too late to ask for leave to amend after the evidence of both sides
had closed. Plaintiffs' counsel argued to the contrary. The trial Judge gave a
considered ruling, in which he referred to what Bramwell,
LJ. said in Tiddesley v. Harper, 10
Ch.D. 396 and 397, in favour of giving leave to
amend, however late the proposed amendment, when the party applying was not
acting mala fide or had not by his blunder done some injury to his
opponent which could not be compensated for by costs or otherwise; and later on
the trial Judge observed that ––
"Both sides know without the colouring on the plans, the area in
dispute and for which the plaintiffs are seeking a declaration of title and
injunction; and it is the area shown as
The learned Judge
granted the amendment asked for.
When the hearing was
resumed, counsel for the defendant said that by oversight he had not put in
some court papers he had wanted, and counsel for the plaintiffs agreed that
they should come in; and thereafter counsel for the defendant addressed the
court on the case; his opponent replied, and later the court gave judgement for
the plaintiffs granting the declaration and the injunction sought; from which
the defendant has appealed.
His first and major complaint
relates to that amendment; he objects that it was a wrong exercise of the
Judge's discretion to allow an amendment which went to the root of the matter
in controversy at a stage gravely prejudicial to the case for the defence; and
his learned counsel cites Loutfi v. C. Czarnikow,
Ltd. (1952) 2 All E.R. 823, for his submission that after the evidence has
been heard, unless there is strong ground and justification for amendment, there should be
none. His argument is that there was no such ground and that, as the amendment
was sought after defendant's counsel had pointed out the inconsistency between
the plaintiffs' plan and their Statement of Claim, the leave to amend was to
the prejudice of the defendant.
Learned counsel for
the plaintiff’s points out that there was agreement on the areas from the start
of the trial and the issue was clear; and he argues that as the amendment was
made to bring their pleadings into line with the evidence, it falls within one
of the cases for amendment mentioned by the learned judge in Loutfi etc.
The Court accepts this
argument as correct. In Loutfi etc. no
formal amendment was submitted until after both counsels had addressed the
court. Sellers J. said (at p. 824 of the report)
"I should allow that amendment because it is simply setting out in
the pleadings that which has emerged in the course of the case as an issue
between the parties."
In the present case
either party called his surveyor at the start of the trial, and both parties
agreed on what was in issue between them by reference to their plans. In effect
they proceeded with the contest as if the plaintiffs' pleading had been what it
became after the amendment; all that the amendment did was to write down what
the defendant had known all along to be the plaintiffs' case. The amendment did
not take him by surprise, and he has no just cause for complaint.
There is a suggestion
for the defendant that he might have wished to call more evidence from other
families. As this suggestion was made in reply, the Court has not the benefit
of argument from the other side. After leave to amend was given, defendant's
counsel in the court below put in some documents as part of his evidence, had
he wished to call more witnesses, he could have asked for leave. He did not ask
for leave to amend his defence; in it he claimed more land than was conceded to
him, and there is no doubt that the oral evidence he called was with a view to
show that he was entitled to the un-conceded part he claimed; and what that
part was he knew from the start of the trial. The suggestion is theoretical
only.
It is also argued for
the defendant that the plaintiffs' plan does not tell him where the boundary is
between what is conceded and what is not. The parties knew when they began the
trial where that boundary was on the ground, and now that there is a judgement
by reference to a plan, it is easy for either side to call a surveyor to put
pillars there.
The judgement is not
altogether correct; that the plaintiffs' learned counsel concedes; the
declaration should be amended to exclude the enclaves in green.
Reverting to the
grounds of appeal, there was the general ground that the judgement was against
the weight of evidence; but the Court did not think that the criticisms made
called for an answer and did not ask counsel for the plaintiffs to answer them.
They were on details of the evidence which it is not necessary to discuss in
this judgement, for they were adequately dealt with in the judgement under
appeal.
It is true that the
dispute between the parties relates to a comparatively small portion of the
area to which the declaration relates; but it is also true that the defendant
did not ask for authority to defend on his family's behalf, and it is the fact
that at one stage he wished to amend his defence in a manner which would leave
it open to him, or others of his family, to claim some other portion of the
plaintiffs' land. The defendant's plan and pleading make it clear that he and
to all appearance his family, claim no more than what is shown in his plan GA 290A/57, and it is highly
desirable not to leave it open to him at any rate, regardless of the position
as it might affect other members of his family, to claim anything else, but to
bind him by this Judgement.
The appeal is
dismissed with thirty-five guineas costs to the plaintiffs/respondents in the
Warri Suit No W/87/1957; but the decision of 6th July, 1962
given in the High Court of the Western Region at Warri in that Suit shall be
varied and amplified as follows:
Judgement for the
plaintiffs granting them ––
(a) a
declaration of title to the piece of land known as Ekrorhior
Quarter Lying and situated at Aladja which is shown
verged in Blue on Plan No MWC/40B/57 (exhibit A in the Suit), less the
two pieces verged in Green on that Plan, as being the property of the Oria Family; and
(b) an
injunction restraining the defendant, his servants and/or his agents from
further erecting any buildings within and/or entering upon the portion of the
land verged in Pink on the said Plan or for any purpose whatsoever without the
authority and permission of the elders of the Oria
Family.
Counsel
Chief F.R.A. Williams with him R.A.I. Ogbobine |
...... |
For
the Appellant |
|
|
|
F.O. Awogu |
...... |
For
the Respondent |